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ABSTRACT:
In many economic situations, neither prices nor authority rules. Rather, in-
dividual behavior is governed by social norms that specify what is allowed
(socially acceptable) and what is forbidden (socially unacceptable). These
norms can emerge in a decentralized way and can serve as a method to bring
order to economic situations. The key component of our solution concept is
a uniform permissible set which plays a role parallel to that of a price system
in competitive equilibrium. The concept is analysed and applied to a variety
of economic and social settings.
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1. Introduction
A family with n members sits down to enjoy a holiday feast. The grandparents have
prepared a delicious traditional pie. All members would love to eat as much as possible
from the pie. Some perhaps appreciate the pie more, others perhaps less, but no market
operates around the dinner table in which family members can exchange slices of the
pie for other assets and the grandparents do not conduct an auction. Instead, a norm
prevails according to which each family member considers grabbing at most 1/n of the
pie. If the norm would be to take up to q > 1/n of the pie, a family crisis would burst.
If the norm were stricter, to take at most q < 1/n of the pie, no conflict arises but the
norm would be unstable since if the upper bound q would increase a bit, no conflict
with feasibility arises.
The family dinner is a typical social scenario which is economic in nature: members
of society face a shortage of some resources and a conflict arises over how to allocate
them. It is also an example in which the resolution of the conflict is decentralized but not
by market mechanisms. Rather, norms evolve which restrict the set of actions that each
agent considers. These norms play an analogous role to competitive prices in markets.
They adjust until harmony is achieved. Unlike prices, they are also subject to another
force: they are relaxed if unnecessary.
The institutions we wish to model are more basic than those traditionally modeled
in economics. They do not require a legal system which enforces ownership rights.
Nonetheless, they do require coordination between the members of society regarding
the limits of what is allowed. As Basu (2010) argues, the existence of norms that prevent
individuals from taking certain actions (like stealing from other people or getting rid of
rivals) is also implicitly assumed in any market model. Thus, the standard general equi-
librium model is not solely a price-based model but rather is a price-and-norms-based
model. In these terms, the model we present here is only norms-based.
A description of the model and the solution concept. The components of the model
are a set of individuals, a uniform set of alternatives that each agent chooses from, a
preference relation for each agent on the set of alternatives, and a societal feasibility
constraint which takes the form of a set of feasible profiles.
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Our proposed equilibrium concept is a set of permissible alternatives combined with
a profile of choices (one for each agent) such that:
(i) each agent’s alternative is optimal from among the permissible alternatives;
(ii) the profile is feasible; and
(iii) there is no larger set of permissible alternatives from which a profile satisfying
(i) and (ii) can be assigned.
In many models, the set of alternatives is a subset of an Euclidean space. In those
cases, we impose a convexity restriction on the permissible set. This restriction reflects
a simplicity requirement of a norm and we will show that it implies that the permissible
set is defined by a finite number of linear inequalities. Furthermore, it is natural that if
two alternatives are permissible, then everything "between them" is permissible as well.
For example if a driver knows that both 40 mph and 80 mph are allowed, then he can
safely conclude that all in-between speeds are as well.
The solution concept reflects a pure stability notion. Two forces make a permissible
set unstable: The first modifies the permissible set in the case that the profile of (in-
tended) choices is not feasible while the second loosens restrictions on the permissible
set as long as the new profile of choices is feasible.
The equilibrium notion offers a decentralized institution for achieving harmony in a
society without introducing any extraneous medium. There is no authority that sets the
norms, just as there is no authority that sets prices in the market. We think about the
permissible set as an expression of social norms which, like competitive prices, apply
uniformly to all individuals in the society, so that all agents face the same choice set.
This uniformity, is first and for most, is a simplicity condition. Norms, especially those
that evolve without a central authority, must be simple and one aspect of simplicity is
that it is applied equally to all agents. There are circumstances in which it would be
natural for norms to discriminate between groups of agents (such as between seniors
and non-seniors) but such a possibility is not discussed here.
We envision that without a central authority, the same invisible hand that calculates
equilibrium prices so effectively is also able to determine a minimal set of forbidden
alternatives for which optimal individualistic behavior is compatible. The social norm
adjusts until harmony is achieved and if there are unnecessarily forbidden alternatives
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such that harmony would prevail even if they were allowed, then the set of permissi-
ble alternatives will expand. While we do not provide a general dynamic process that
converges to equilibrium, in several examples we demonstrate how a tatonnement-like
process leads to an equilibrium.
Some leading scenarios.
1. Give-and-take Each member of a society either gives to or takes from the society.
Some individuals want to contribute to society while others want to take from soci-
ety. The feasibility constraint requires that what people take cannot exceed what peo-
ple give. A unique equilibrium exists and is Pareto-efficient. Assuming that the sum of
the ideal contributions is less than the sum of the ideal withdrawals, the equilibrium
permissible set does not restrict contributions but puts a cap on what agents consider
taking, so that a balance is maintained.
2. Keeping close economy The survival of a group depends on the ability of its members
to reach one another within a certain amount of time in case of danger. Therefore, they
need to live within a certain distance from each other. The members have preferences
over where they will live. An equilibrium imposes minimal restrictions on the permitted
locations so that individuals’ choices fulfill the closeness requirement. In this economy,
every Pareto-efficient profile of locations is an equilibrium outcome.
3. Division A total bundle is to be distributed among a group of people. Social norms
determine the set of permissible bundles. In equilibrium, the total demand should not
exceed the total bundle. The division of the dinner pie is an example with one good.
With more than one good, the model becomes more intriguing.
A prominent equilibrium (though not necessarily unique) is defined by the egalitar-
ian competitive equilibrium linear prices (in which all agents are initially endowed with
an equal share of the total bundle). The equilibrium permissible set contains all bundles
with a value that does not exceed 1/n of the total bundle’s value.
A comparison to fairness notions. This paper is not meant to be normative by any
means although the equilibrium has two fairness properties:
(i) All agents face the same choice set. This property is shared with competitive equilib-
rium in which all agents face the same (local) trading opportunities.
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(ii) An equilibrium profile is envy-free (see Foley (1965)).
These fairness properties call for a comparison of our approach with the fairness liter-
ature which deals with division economies (see for example, Thomson (2019)). We will
see that our equilibrium concept is very different from well-known fairness concepts
such as efficient envy-free outcomes (Varian (1974)) or the egalitarian efficient alloca-
tion notion (Pazner and Schmeidler (1978)).
In the rest of the paper, we formally define the solution concept and prove some
general results about its structure. We present several existence theorems and "welfare
theorems" which identify when equilibrium outcomes are efficient and find conditions
under which any Pareto-efficient allocation is an equilibrium outcome. Much of what
follows is devoted to an analysis of examples, some of which are traditional economic
settings while others demonstrate the potential to apply the model to other types of
social situations.
2. The Equilibrium Concept
2.1 Economy and Equilibrium
We start by defining the economic environment. Its ingredients are a set of agents, a set
of individualistic alternatives, the agents’ preference relations on the set of alternatives,
and a constraint on the feasible profiles of choices:
Definition 1 An economy is a tuple ‹N , X ,{%i }i∈N , F › where N is a finite set of agents, X
is a set of (individualistic) alternatives, %i is agent i ’s preference on X and F is a subset of
X N (the set of profiles) which contains all feasible choice profiles.
A candidate for an equilibrium is a configuration consisting of a permissible set and a
profile of choices:
Definition 2 A configuration is a pair ‹Y , (y i )› where Y ⊆ X and (y i ) is a profile of ele-
ments in Y . We refer to Y as a permissible set and to (y i ) as an outcome.
Thus, a configuration has a structure analogous to that of competitive equilibrium.
The price system that is applied uniformly to all economic agents in the competitive
case is replaced here by a permissible set which uniformly binds all agents.
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Our central equilibrium concept is given in the following definition which makes
use of the auxiliary concept of para-equilibrium. A para-equilibrium is a configuration
in which each individual maximizes his interests and in addition the profile of choices is
feasible. An equilibrium is a para-equilibrium such that any expansion of the admissible
set will cause a violation of feasibility if agents optimally respond to the expansion.
Definition 3 A para-equilibrium is a configuration ‹Y , (y i )› satisfying:
(i) for all i , y i is a%i -maximal alternative in Y ; and
(ii) (y i )∈ F
An equilibrium is a para-equilibrium such that there is no para-equilibrium ‹Z , (z i )›
such that Z ) Y .
Like competitive equilibrium prices, we view the permissible set not as being chosen
by some authority but rather evolving through an invisible-hand-like process with two
forces: first, if the profile of intended choices from the permissible set is not feasible, al-
ternatives are slowly added or removed to the permissible set. Second, when the profile
of chosen alternatives is feasible, additional alternatives are added to the permissible
set as long as harmony is not disturbed. Note that when assessing whether harmony is
violated by loosened constraints, choices are not static and may adapt to the loosening.
The permissible set reflects uniform social norms. This uniformity is analogous to
the uniformity of the price system in a competitive equilibrium. We view the uniformity
mainly as a simplicity property. Simple social norms should not distinguish between
agents based on their names or preferences. As mentioned earlier, there are situations in
life where norms naturally place nonuniform constraints on agents based on additional
personal information (such as allowing handicapped drivers to park in places where
others would not consider) but such a possibility is not considered here.
In equilibrium, all agents face the same choice set and since all agents are rational,
no one strictly desires the alternative chosen by another to his own. In other words, the
profile of choices in any equilibrium is "envy-free" (see Foley (1967)):
Definition 4 A profile (y i ) is envy-free if for all i 6= j , y i %i y j .
A profile (y i ) is strictly envy-free if for all i 6= j , y i i y j .
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Comment: We have been asked how our equilibrium concept relates to Debreu (1952)’s
notion of a "generalized game". First, Debreu’s equilibrium notion is game-theoretic,
unlike ours. A generalized game differs from a standard non-cooperative game in that
the set of actions available to players is restricted by the actions of the other players. De-
breu’s equilibrium is a profile of actions such that each player’s action is a best response
from among the set of actions that are available to him given the other players’ actions . In
contrast, a fundamental feature that underlies competitive equilibrium analysis - and
our concept as well - is that an agent considers all permissible alternatives, including
those that are not compatible with the other agents’ choices. Thus, a key difference is
that Debreu’s notion restricts the profile of actions that agents can consider, whereas
our feasibility restriction limits the profiles of choices that are compatible.
2.2 Existence
Later we provide several general existence results, however not every economy has an
equilibrium. For example, consider the "housing economy" in which each agent can
choose a single house and feasibility requires that each house is chosen at most once. If
all individuals have the same strict preferences over the houses then no equilibrium ex-
ists since, whatever the permissible set is, all agents would pick the same house, which
violates feasibility. The lack of equilibrium in such an economy fits the intuition that so-
cial norms regarding "the permissible and the forbidden" do not resolve conflicts when
agents have similar preferences and feasibility requires them to make different choices.
2.3 Efficiency
An equilibrium outcome can be Pareto-inefficient. For example, consider the "housing
economy" where N = {1,2}, X = {a ,b , c , d , e } and the agents’ preferences are a 1 b 1
c 1 d 1 e and a 2 c 2 b 2 e 2 d . One para-equilibrium is Y = {d , e }, y 1 = d , y 2 = e
but it is not an equilibrium. The unique equilibrium is Y = {b , c , d , e }with y 1 =b , y 2 = c
(the alterative a cannot be added to the permissible set). The equilibrium outcome is
Pareto-inefficient because the universal favorite house is unassigned.
Although an equilibrium outcome may be Pareto-inefficient, the following proposi-
tion is a "second-best" result: The equilibrium outcomes are precisely the profiles that
are Pareto-efficient among the set of envy-free profiles.
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Proposition 1 A profile is an equilibrium outcome if and only if it is Pareto-efficient
among all feasible envy-free profiles.
Proof. Let ‹Y , (y i )›be an equilibrium. The profile (y i ) is envy-free. If it is Pareto-inefficient
among the feasible envy-free profiles, then there is a feasible envy-free profile (z i ) that
Pareto-dominates (y i ). Clearly, ‹Y ∪{z 1, .., z n}, (z i )› is a para-equilibrium and for at least
one agent i , z i i y i and therefore z i /∈ Y , contradicting the maximality of ‹Y , (y i )›.
Let (y i ) be Pareto-efficient among the feasible envy-free profiles. Define the per-
missible set Y = ∪i {y i } ∪ {x | for all i , y i %i x }. Clearly, ‹Y , (y i )› is a para-equilibrium.
Suppose that ‹Z , (z i )› is a para-equilibrium with Z ) Y . Then, z i %i y i for all i and
(z i ) is envy-free. Take an x ∈ Z − Y . There is an agent j for whom x j y j and conse-
quently, z j %j x j y j . Therefore, (z i ) is an envy-free profile which Pareto-dominates
(y i ), contradicting (y i ) being Pareto-efficient among the envy-free profiles. Thus, no
such ‹Z , (z i )› can exist and ‹Y , (y i )› is an equilibrium. 
A condition on F which guarantees that any equilibrium outcome is overall Pareto-
efficient is given in the following proposition. The condition, which we refer to as the
imitation property, requires that if a profile is feasible, then so is any profile for which
one agent adopts the alternative chosen by another agent instead of his own. Example
E in Section 4 satisfies this condition.
Proposition 2 Assume that F satisfies the following imitation property: if a ∈ F , then
any profile b , which differs from a only in that there is a unique i for which b i 6= a i and
b i = a j for some j , is also in F . Then, a profile is an equilibrium outcome if and only if it
is Pareto-efficient.
Proof. Let ‹Y , (y i )› be an equilibrium with Pareto-inefficient outcome. Then, there is
a feasible profile (z i ) which Pareto-dominates (y i ). However, in the profile (z i ) some
agents may envy others, so we use (z i ) to define an envy-free feasible profile (x i ) that
also Pareto-dominates (y i ), violating Proposition 1.
Assign x 1, a %1-maximal alternative from {z 1, ..., z N }, to agent 1. Assign x 2, a %2-
maximal alternative from {x 1, z 2, . . . , z N }, to agent 2, and so on to form the profile (x i ).
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In this construction: 1) the profile selected at each stage is feasible (due to the imitation
property) and weakly Pareto-dominates the previous one; and 2) at stage j , no agent
i ≤ j envies any other agent. Therefore, (x i ) is envy-free and Pareto-dominates (y i ).
The other direction follows from Proposition 1 because under the imitation condi-
tion on F , every Pareto-efficient profile is envy-free and therefore is efficient among the
envy-free allocations. 
3. Examples
Example A: The splitting cakes economy
There are situations in life where limited quantities of goods can be distributed between
agents but each agent can consume only one of the goods. The goods could be con-
sumption goods in different locations, risky assets in a world of risk-loving agents or
meat and dairy dishes in a kosher community.
Social norms attach a "quota" to each good. An equilibrium in this economy is a
specification of maximal quotas for which demand does not exceed supply for each
of the goods. The quotas should be low enough so that demand will not exceed the
available quantity but also not too low so that they can be relaxed without the demands
hitting one of the bounds. We will see that an equilibrium exists and is unique. The
economy might not have an envy-free and efficient allocation, but the equilibrium will
be shown to always be "almost efficient".
Formally, there are two goods in the economy, 1 and 2, with total supply (α,β ). Each
agent can choose a quantity of a single good, that is, the set of alternatives X consists of
all objects of the type (a ,0) and (0,b ) where a and b are non-negative real numbers. A
profile is feasible if for each good the sum of the agents’ consumptions of that good does
not exceed its total supply. Agents have continuous and strictly monotonic preferences
over X . To avoid degenerate cases, we assume that there are numbers a and b such that
all agents prefer (a ,0) to (0,β ) and (0,b ) to (α,0). Note that our analysis would apply
equally to any economy of K goods where each agent consumes only one of them.
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Claim A In any splitting cakes economy:
(i) There is a unique equilibrium set.
(ii) In any equilibrium, at least one of the goods is fully consumed.
(iii) In any equilibrium, if a good is not fully allocated, then the unallocated portion
is not larger than the maximum allowed quantity of that good.
Proof. Note that in any para-equilibrium, if at least one agent takes a portion of a certain
pie, then this must be the upper bound on the permissible consumption of that pie
and all agents who consume from this pie take this bound. If one of the pies is not
consumed by any agent, then by the continuity of the preferences we can assume that
the permissible set specifies an upper bound on its consumption. Thus, given a para-
equilibrium ‹W, (w i )›, let a W =max(a : (a ,0)∈W ) and bW =max(b : (0,b )∈W ).
Step 1: If ‹Y , (y i )› and ‹Z , (z i )› are para-equilibria, then there is a para-equilibrium
with the permissible set Y ∪Z .
The claim is trivial if one of the the permissible sets offers a weakly larger portion
of each pie than the other. Otherwise, without loss of generality, we have a Y > a Z and
bZ >bY . Then, a Y∪Z = a Y and bY∪Z =bZ . Take the permissible set to be Y ∪Z and attach
to each agent an individually optimal bundle in {(a Y ,0), (0,bZ )}. Total consumption of
the first good is then bounded above by #{i : (a Y ,0) %i (0,bZ )} ∗ a Y ≤ #{i : (a Y ,0) i
(0,bY )} ∗ a Y ≤ α. An analogous argument applies to the second good, and thus for each
good demand does not exceed supply.
Step 2: Existence of an equilibrium.
Let a ∗ = sup{a Y : ‹Y , (y i )› is a para-equilibrium} and similarly define b ∗ (obviously,
para-equilibria exist). It is sufficient to show that M = {(x1,x2) ∈ X : x1 ≤ a ∗, x2 ≤ b ∗} is
a permissible set in some para-equilibrium. By definition, there are sequences of para-
equilibrium permissible sets (Yn ) and (Zn ) such that a Yn → a
∗ and bZn → b
∗. By Step 1,
Wn = Yn ∪Zn is a sequence of para-equilibrium sets and of course (a Wn ,bWn )→ (a
∗,b ∗).
This sequence of para-equilibria has a subsequence in which a fixed set of agents Q
choose (a Wn ,0) and the remainder N −Q choose (0,bWn ). It remains to be shown that
‹M , (m i )› is a para-equilibrium where m i = (a ∗,0) if i ∈Q and m i = (0,b ∗) if i ∈N−Q . To
verify feasibility of (m i ), notice that a W n ∙ |Q | ≤ α and therefore a ∗ ∙ |Q | ≤ α and similarly
for the other good. To verify individual optimality, notice that since (a W n ,0)%i (0,bWn )
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for all i ∈Q and for all n , then by continuity (a ∗,0)%i (0,b ∗) for all i ∈Q . Similarly, (0,b ∗)
%i (a ∗,0) for all i ∈N −Q .
Step 3: M is the unique equilibrium permissible set.
Given any para-equilibrium ‹Y , (y i )›, by the definition of a ∗ and b ∗, it is the case that
a ∗ ≥ a Y and b ∗ ≥bY . Thus, Y ⊆M .
Step 4: In an equilibrium, at least one of the goods is fully consumed.
Assume otherwise. Let ‹M , (y i )› be an equilibrium where k agents are allocated
(a ∗,0) while N − k agents are allocated (0,b ∗) and no good is fully consumed, that is,
k a ∗ < α and (N − k )b ∗ < β and thus a ′ = α/k > a ∗ and b ′ = β/(N − k ) > b ∗. Define
Y λ = {(x1,x2) ∈ X : (x1,x2) ≤ (λa ′ + (1− λ)a ∗,λb ∗ + (1− λ)b ′)}. When λ = 0, at least
N − k agents prefer (0,bY 0 = b ′) to (a Y 0 = a ∗, , 0). When λ = 1, at least k agents pre-
fer (a Y 1 = a ′,0) to (0,bY 1 = b ∗). By continuity, there is some intermediate λ where at
least k agents weakly prefer (λa ′+ (1−λ)a ∗, 0) to (0,λb ∗+ (1−λ)b ′)) and at least N − k
agents weakly prefer (0,λb ∗+(1−λ)b ′)) to (λa ′+(1−λ)a ∗,0). Then, Y λ is a larger para-
equilibrium permissible set, contradicting step 3.
Step 5: For any equilibrium, if a good is not fully consumed, then its unallocated
portion is not larger than each allocated portion of that good.
Suppose ‹M , (y i )› is an equilibrium where k agents choose (a ∗, 0) and α−k a ∗ > a ∗. If
every agent who chooses (0,b ∗) strictly prefers (0,b ∗) to (a ∗,0), then a ∗ can be slightly in-
creased without changing consumption patterns, thus violating the maximality of M .
Otherwise, for at least one i , y i = (0,b ∗) and (a ∗,0) ∼i (0,b ∗). Then, modifying the
equilibrium so that agent i would choose (a ∗,0) instead of (0,b ∗) is an equilibrium (it
is a para-equilibrium and since we started with an equilibrium there is no larger para-
equilibrium) in which no good is fully consumed, contradicting Step 4. 
Discussion: The unique equilibrium for this economy has an intuitive structure. All
agents face a quota for each good and any increase in one or both quotas will yield ex-
cess demand. The unique equilibrium can emerge through a dynamic process where
the quotas are adjusted according to excess supply or demand. In the case that both
goods are fully consumed, the equilibrium is Pareto-efficient. Otherwise, at most one
quota of one of the goods is wasted, an inefficiency which is necessary for harmony.
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Example B: Quorum economy
The following is a particular simple model of clubs (Buchanan (1965)) where agents have
preferences on the set of clubs and in order to operate, a club needs a minimal quorum.
If each agent were to choose his most beloved club, then there may be insufficiently
occupied non-empty clubs. The role of the permissible set is to facilitate coordination
with minimal restrictions on the agents. We will see that in such an economy efficiency
is not guaranteed in equilibrium.
Formally, let X be a finite set of clubs. Each agent has preferences over X and selects
one club. Feasibility requires that club x is empty or chosen by at least mx ≤ n members.
Any configuration Y = {x } combined with all agents choosing x is a para-equilibrium.
Since there are finitely many permissible sets, an equilibrium always exists.
Claim B In some quorum economies, every equilibrium is Pareto-inefficient.
Proof. Consider the quorum economy with N = 6, X = {a ,b , c }, and mx = 3 for all x .
Suppose two agents have the preferences a  b  c , two have the preferences b  c  a
and two have the preferences c  a b . There is no feasible allocation with three active
clubs. There is no para-equilibrium set with two clubs since four of the agents would
choose one club and only two would choose the other, violating feasibility. Therefore,
any equilibrium permissible set consists of one club. However, any constant profile is
Pareto-inefficient since there is a different club that is strictly preferred by four agents,
and there is a Pareto improvement whereby exactly three of them switch clubs. 
Comment: Two natural forces may operate dynamically in this example. First, a club
that does not have a quorum is removed from the permissible set. Second, from time to
time, a forbidden club may become socially acceptable for a while until it is determined




Of special interest are the Euclidean economies in which the set of alternatives is em-
bedded in a Euclidean space. In such economies, we introduce standard closedness,
convexity and differentiability restrictions on the parameters of the model (the set of
alternatives, the preference relations and the feasibility set).
Definition 5 An economy ‹N , X ,{%i }i∈N , F › is a Euclidean economy if:
(i) The set X is a closed convex subset of some Euclidean space.
(ii) The preferences {%i }i∈N are continuous and convex.
(iii) The feasibility set F is closed and convex.
We say that a Euclidean economy is differentiable if the preferences are strictly convex
and differentiable (differentiable preferences have differentiable utility representations or
more generally satisfy the condition suggested in Rubinstein (2007)).
4.2 Existence
Any Euclidean economy, when F is compact and anonymous (closed under permuta-
tions), has an equilibrium. Note that in any equilibrium, the permissible set must be
closed since if ‹Y , (y i )› is a para-equilibrium then ‹c l (Y ), (y i )› is as well.
Proposition 3 For Euclidean economies, if F is compact and closed under permutations,
then an equilibrium exists.
Proof. Let E F F be the set of envy-free feasible profiles. To see that E F F is not empty,
start with any feasible profile. By assumption, all permutations of this profile are in F as
well. The average of these permutations is a constant profile which is in F (because F is
convex) and is envy-free, and thus it is in E F F .
Since each preference%i is continuous and X is a subset of a Euclidean space, there
is a continuous utility function u i representing%i . Also, by continuity of the preferences
and F being compact, the set E F F (which is defined by weak inequalities) is compact.
Thus, there is at least one profile z ∈ E F F that maximizes
∑
i u
i (x i ) over E F F and there-
fore z is Pareto-efficient in E F F . By Proposition 1, z is an equilibrium outcome. 
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4.3 Efficiency
As shown in Proposition 1, equilibrium outcomes are the Pareto-efficient allocations
from among the envy-free allocations, but may be overall Pareto-inefficient (Examples A
and B). The next proposition states that for differentiable Euclidean economies, the gap
between equilibrium outcomes and Pareto-efficient profiles is within the set of envy-
free allocations with indifferences.
Proposition 4 In a Euclidean economy, a strictly envy-free profile is an equilibrium out-
come if and only if it is overall Pareto-efficient.
Proof. One direction is trivial. If an envy-free profile is Pareto-efficient, then by Propo-
sition 1 it is an equilibrium outcome.
In the other direction, assume that ‹Y , (y i )› is an equilibrium and y i i y j for all i 6= j .
If (y i ) is Pareto-inefficient, then there is (z i ) such that z i %i y i for all i and z k k y k for
some k . By convexity of the preferences, any profile (λz i + (1− λ)y i ) weakly Pareto-
dominates (y i ) and is feasible because F is convex. Let λ̄ < 1 be the largest λ for which
λz i +(1−λ)y i ∼i y i for all i . By the continuity of the agents’ preferences, for ε > 0 small
enough, ((λ̄+ε)z i+(1−λ̄−ε)y i )i ((λ̄+ε)z j +(1−λ̄−ε)y j ) for all i 6= j . Thus, the profile
((λ̄+ε)z i +(1−λ̄−ε)y i )) is envy-free and by the definition of λ̄, it Pareto-dominates (y i ).
Thus, (y i ) is not Pareto-efficient among the envy-free profiles, violating Proposition 1. 
5. Convex Equilibrium
Up to this point, we have not imposed any restrictions on the structure of the permissi-
ble set. In this section, we study Euclidean economies and require that the permissible
set be convex. We first define the notion of convex equilibrium and then consider three
issues: the efficiency of its outcome, its existence and the structure of the convex equi-
librium permissible set.
5.1 Convex Equilibrium
A convex equilibrium is required to have a convex permissible set. This requirement
captures a natural asymmetry between what is allowed and what is forbidden. For ex-
ample, one would certainly conclude that if driving on a highway at 60 mph and at 80
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mph are permitted, then driving at 70 mph is as well. On the other hand, knowing that
driving at 110 mph and at 10 mph are forbidden does not lead one to believe that driving
at 60 mph is forbidden. This is consistent with the intuition that forbidden actions are
typically "extreme" and that the permissible set captures some "middle ground".
Another justification for requiring that the permissible set be convex is the view that
the equilibrium permissible set must be describable in a "simple" way. In the Euclidean
setting, a natural notion of simplicity is that the set is describable by a small number of
inequalities. Proposition 7 below shows that the requirement that the permissible set
be convex is equivalent to the requirement that it be defined by a small system of linear
inequalities.
Definition 6 For Euclidean economies , a convex para-equilibrium is a para-equilibrium
‹Y , (y i )› such that Y is convex.
A convex equilibrium is a convex para-equilibrium ‹Y , (y i )› such that there is no other
convex para-equilibrium ‹Z , (z i )›with Z ) Y .
The notions of equilibrium and convex equilibrium are non-nested, although every
convex para-equilibrium is a para-equilibrium. This is because to rule out a convex
para-equilibrium being a convex equilibrium there is a need to find a larger convex para-
equilibrium. Example D contains cases in which there are more equilibria than convex
equilibria and in Example E the opposite may occur.
5.2 Convex Equilibrium and Efficiency
Proposition 5 states that any profile which is Pareto-efficient among the convex para-
equilibrium outcomes is also a convex equilibrium outcome. This is analogous to one
of the directions of Proposition 1. The other direction does not hold: in Example E,
there is a convex equilibrium outcome which is Pareto-dominated by another convex
para-equilibrium outcome.
Proposition 5 For Euclidean economies, any convex para-equilibrium outcome which is
Pareto-efficient among the convex para-equilibrium outcomes, is a convex equilibrium
outcome.
Proof. Let (y i ) be a convex para-equilibrium outcome. Let P consist of all sets Y for
which ‹Y , (y i )› is a convex para-equilibrium. Endow P with the partial order ⊇. To show
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that P has a maximal set we apply Zorn’s Lemma. (Given a partially ordered set P , if
every chain – a completely ordered subset of P – has an upper bound in P , then the set
P has at least one maximal element.)
In order to show that any chain C of elements in P has an upper bound in P , we show
that U , the union of the sets in C , is in P . The set U is convex since for any two points x , y
in U , there is some Y ∈C such that x , y ∈ Y and therefore all convex combinations of x
and y are in Y and therefore in U . To see that ‹U , (y i )› is a para-equilibrium, it suffices to
show that for each i the element y i is%i -maximal in U . Suppose that there is an x ∈U
such that x i y i for some i . Then, there is some Y ∈ C such that x ∈ Y , contradicting
that ‹Y , (y i )› is a para-equilibrium.
Now suppose that there is a convex para-equilibrium ‹Z , (z i )› such that Z ) Y ∗. It
must be that z i %i y i for all i . Since (y i ) is Pareto-efficient [in P ] [among the convex
para-equilibrium outcomes], it must be that z i ∼i y i for all i . Then, ‹Z , (y i )› is a convex
para-equilibrium, contradicting the maximality of Y ∗. 
5.3 Existence of Convex Equilibrium
The following proposition demonstrates that when X is compact and F is closed under
permutations, then a convex equilibrium exists.
Proposition 6 For Euclidean economies, if F is compact and closed under permutations,
then a convex equilibrium exists.
Proof. Let O be the set of convex para-equilibrium outcomes. The set O is not empty,
since, as in Proposition 3, there is a constant profile (y i = y ∗) in F and thus, the pair
‹{y ∗}, (y i = y ∗)› is a convex para-equilibrium.
The set O is compact. To see this, since F is compact, it suffices to show that O is
closed. Take a sequence of profiles (y i )n in O that converges to (z i ). Let Z = conv (z i ).
The configuration ‹Z , (z i )› is a convex para-equilibrium since if there is an agent j such
that
∑
λi z i j z j , then by continuity, for some large enough n ,
∑
λi y in 
j y jn , violating
that (y i )n is a convex para-equilibrium outcome.
Now proceed as in Proposition 3. Since O is compact, there is a profile z that is
Pareto-efficient in O. By Proposition 5, z is a convex equilibrium outcome. 
16
5.4 A Structure Theorem
We turn to the most significant result in this section. Proposition 7 concerns the struc-
ture of the permissible set of convex equilibria in differentiable Euclidean economies. It
states that in any convex equilibrium the permissible set is an intersection of a finite set
of half-spaces, with at most one half-space per agent. Thus, as previously mentioned,
Proposition 7 provides a formal basis for the assertion that the convexity of the permis-
sible set is a simplicity requirement.
Proposition 7 Let ‹Y , (y i )› be a convex equilibrium in a differentiable Euclidean economy
and let J = {i | y i is not%i -global maximum in X }. Then, there is a profile of closed half-
spaces (H i )i∈J , such that Y = ∩i∈J H i .
Proof. By the differentiability and strict convexity of the agents’ preference relations, for
every i ∈ J there is a unique largest closed half-space H i containing y i such that y i is
strictly preferred to all other elements in H i .
First we show that Y ⊆ ∩i∈J H i : Suppose that for some i ∈ J , there is w i ∈ Y \H i . By
the differentiability and strict convexity of i ’s preferences, and for small ε > 0, εw i +
(1− ε)y i i y i and by convexity of Y , εw i + (1− ε)y i ∈ Y . Therefore, y i is not top i -
ranked in Y , a contradiction.
It suffices to show that ‹∩i∈J H i , (y i )› is a convex para-equilibrium. This follows from:
(i) the set ∩i∈J H i is convex;
(ii) for each agent k , y k ∈ Y ⊆∩i∈J H i ;
(iii) for each j /∈ J , y j is a global maximum and therefore is %j -maximal in ∩i∈J H i ;
(iv) for each j ∈ J , y j is%j -maximal in H j and therefore is%j -maximal in ∩i∈J H i . 
6. Convex Equilibrium: Examples
Example C: A division economy
A leading economic problem is the division of limited resources among the members of
a society. In the introduction, we discussed the case in which one "pie" (a single good)
is to be divided among a group of agents. In this case, a natural equilibrium is the norm
which forbids grabbing more than 1/n th of the pie. However, when there is more than
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one good to be divided, the norm which allows an agent to take up to 1/n th of each
good is not an equilibrium: it will be shown that there is always an equilibrium with
a larger admissible set in which agents’ choices may reflect their preferences regarding
the tradeoffs between the goods. We now explore the existence, structure and efficiency
properties of convex equilibria in this economy.
A division economy ‹N , X ,{%i }i∈N , F › is a differentiable Euclidean economy such that:
(i) The set X =Rm+ is the set of bundles.
(ii) Agents’ preferences {%i }i∈N are monotonic (in addition to being continuous, strictly
convex and differentiable).
(iii) There is a bundle e ∈Rm++ such that (x
i )∈ F if and only if
∑
i x
i ≤ e .
The next claim states that every egalitarian competitive equilibrium allocation, in
which at least one agent chooses an interior bundle, is a convex equilibrium outcome
and that every Pareto-efficient interior convex equilibrium profile is an egalitarian com-
petitive equilibrium allocation. However there may also exist interior convex equilib-
rium outcomes that are Pareto-inefficient.
Claim C In any division economy ‹N , X ,{%i }i∈N , F › :
(i) (a) Each egalitarian competitive equilibrium allocation is a convex equilibrium out-
come. (b) If at least one agent has an interior bundle, then the permissible set equals an
egalitarian competitive equilibrium budget set.
(ii) If an interior profile is a Pareto-efficient convex equilibrium outcome, then it is an
egalitarian competitive equilibrium allocation.
(iii) There can exist a Pareto-efficient convex equilibrium outcome (where some agent re-
ceives zero of some good) that is not an egalitarian competitive equilibrium allocation.
(iv) There can exist a Pareto-inefficient interior convex equilibrium outcome.
Proof. (i) (a) Let ‹p ∗, (y i )› be a competitive equilibrium in the exchange economy in
which each agent is initially endowed with e /n and let Y be the (common) budget set.
The pair ‹Y , (y i )› is a convex para-equilibrium and the profile (y i ) is Pareto-efficient.
Thus, by Proposition 5, (y i ) is a convex equilibrium outcome.
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(b) If ‹Z , (y i )› is a convex equilibrium, then Z = ∩i∈N H i (Proposition 7) where H i is
the lower half-space of %i at y i . Furthermore, for all i , Y ⊆ H i and since y j is interior
for some j , then H j = Y and thus, Z = ∩ J H j = Y .
(ii) Let ‹Y , (y i )› be a convex equilibrium and (y i ) be interior. For each agent i , the cho-
sen alternative y i is not%i -globally maximal and thus by Proposition 7, Y = ∩
i∈N
H i . Since
each y i ∈Rm++ and the allocation is Pareto-efficient the half-spaces must be parallel (oth-
erwise, any two agents on non-parallel half spaces could make a Pareto-improving local
exchange). By monotonicity, the half-spaces must be identical and equal to Y = {x |px ≤
w } for some positive vector p and a number w . For each i , the bundle y i is optimal in
Y and by monotonicity, py i =w . Since p e = p
∑
i∈N
y i , we have py i = p (e /n ). Thus, (y i )
is a competitive egalitarian equilibrium allocation with price vector p .
(iii) Consider the division economy (see Figure 1) with three agents, e = (5,5) and pref-
erences represented by the following utility functions (a slight modification of the pref-
erences will make the preference relations strictly convex):
u 1(x1,x2) = x1+5x2
u 2(x1,x2) = x1+x2
u 3(x1,x2) = 5x1+x2
Let y 1 = (0,3), y 2 = (2,2) and y 3 = (3,0) . The
allocation (y i ) is Pareto-efficient since if (z i )














2 ) = 10 which is not fea-
sible. Let Y be the set of all bundles below
Figure 1: A convex equilibrium with a
non-egalitarian Pareto-efficient assign-
ment (Example C).
the three indifference curves of individuals i = 1,2,3 through y i . The pair ‹Y , (y i )› is a
convex para-equilibrium. If there were a larger convex para-equilibrium, ‹Z , (z i )›, then
Z would contain an element that is not in Y and any such element is strictly preferred
to y i for at least one agent i . Thus, (z i ) would Pareto-dominate (y i ).
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(iv) Consider the division economy (de-
picted in Figure 2) with two agents, two














2 . The depicted alloca-
tion y 1 = (
p
3, 1) and y 2 = (1,
p
3) is ineffi-
cient since for small enough ε > 0 it is mutu-
ally beneficial to have agent 1 getting εmore
of good 1 and ε less of good 2.
𝑦 = 3, 1







Figure 2: A Pareto-inefficient con-
vex equilibrium.
The configuration ‹Y , (y i )› is a convex para-equilibrium. In any larger convex para-
equilibrium, ‹Z , (z i )›, the convex set Z includes a bundle which is strictly better for at
least one of the agents and therefore z 1 6= y 1 and z 2 6= y 2. Given the indifference curves
through y 1 and y 2, agent 1 receives in z 1 more of good 1 and less of good 2 and agent 2
receives in z 2 less of good 1 and more of good 2. Also, agent 1 must not prefer another











. Therefore, the negative slope
through agent 1’s indifference curve at z 1 (namely,
3z 12
z 11
) is at least as large as the negative

















. However, at least one





only z 1 that satisfies both inequalities is z 1 = y 1. A contradiction. 
Discussion: Our equilibrium notion is very different than Pazner and Schmeidler (1978)’s
fairness notion of egalitarian efficiency: an allocation (x i ) is egalitarian efficient if it is
Pareto-efficient and there is a bundle y ∗ such that x i ∼i y ∗ for all i . An egalitarian effi-
cient allocation need not be envy-free and therefore is never an equilibrium outcome.
Note that a division economy differs from an exchange economy because it does not
specify any initial distribution. However, the analysis of the division economy can also
be applied to the exchange economy with initial distribution (e i ) as follows: Let X =RK




i = 0 and for each agent i , t i + e i ≥ 0. The preferences of agent i over
the set {t i | t i + e i ≥ 0} are derived from the preferences on the consumption bundles;
all transfers that leave the agent with a negative amount of at least one good are taken
to be inferior to the no-exchange option 0. Claim C then is read as (i) any competitive
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equilibrium of the exchange economy is also a convex equilibrium outcome and (ii) any
interior Pareto-efficient convex equilibrium outcome is a competitive equilibrium vec-
tor of transfers in the exchange economy.
Division economy with concave preferences: The existence of a Pareto-efficient envy-
free profile may fail in the case of concave preferences (Varian, 1974) and therefore an
egalitarian competitive equilibrium may not exist. In contrast, Proposition 6 shows that
if preferences are continuous then a convex equilibrium exists even if neither convexity
nor monotonicity hold. The constructed convex permissible set includes e /N ; however,
without convexity of preferences, Proposition 7 does not apply and the permissible set
is not necessarily a budget set.
This brings us to another definition: a budget para-equilibrium is a para-equilibrium
whose permissible set is given by a budget set Y = {x ∈Rm+ : p ∙x ≤ I } for some price vec-
tor p ≥ 0 and I ≥ 0. A budget equilibrium is a budget para-equilibrium for which there is
no budget para-equilibrium with a strictly larger budget set. When an egalitarian com-
petitive equilibrium exists it is a budget equilibrium. However, we will see that in con-
cave division economies there are budget equilibria even when there are no egalitarian
competitive equilibria. The proof is based on Example A (the splitting cakes economy).
Claim C (Concavity) For a division economy with strictly concave preferences, there is
a budget equilibrium, its permissible set is unique and the budget equilibria outcome is
unique up to a permutation. In these equilibria, each agent consumes only one good, at
least one good is fully consumed and any good that is not fully consumed has a leftover
not larger than any agent’s non-zero consumption of that good.
Proof. From any budget set, an agent with concave preferences always chooses a quan-
tity of only one good. Thus, agents’ behavior is identical to that in the splitting cakes
economy, where agents were physically restricted to choosing a quantity of only one
good. Each budget para-equilibrium corresponds to a splitting cakes para-equilibrium.
Since there is a unique equilibrium permissible set in Example A, the convex hull of the
cake-splitting equilibrium permissible set is the unique budget equilibrium set. 
21
When preferences are convex, the budget equilibria are precisely the standard egali-
tarian competitive equilibria and there may be a multiplicity of equilibrium budget sets.
In contrast, when agents have concave preferences, a budget equilibrium exists and
its budget set is unique. Thus, while in many economic settings convexity guarantees
"good behavior" of the economic model, here the opposite is true...
Example D: The give-and-take economy
There are situations in life where a redistribution is done entirely voluntarily. Some in-
dividuals give to others and some take (for example, through a food charity) without
exercising force, without commitment to get back, and without an authority who forces
the redistribution. Social norms that bound the individuals’ actions constitute a poten-
tial decentralized mechanism that can bring balance.
In order to formalize these ideas, we analyse the give-and-take economy first stud-
ied by Sprumont (1991) (see also Richter and Rubinstein (2015)). Let X = [−1,1], where a
positive x represents a withdrawal of x from a social fund and a negative x represents a




i = 0. All agents have strictly convex and continuous (i.e. single-peaked) prefer-
ences over X with agent i ’s ideal denoted by p e a k i . Obviously, if
∑
i p e a k
i = 0 there is
a unique equilibrium ‹Y , (p e a k i )›.
The following claim characterizes the unique convex equilibrium and shows that it is
Pareto-efficient. As it turns out, the unique convex equilibrium outcome coincides with
Sprumont (1991)’s Uniform Rule, which he derives through a quite different axiomatic
characterization as opposed to the equilibrium approach taken here.
Claim D Consider a give-and-take economy with
∑
p e a k i > 0. There is a unique convex
equilibrium ‹Y , (y i )›. The set Y takes the form [−1, m ] and (y i ) is Pareto-efficient.
Proof. We first show that there is a unique m such that [−1, m ] is a para-equilibrium set.
If m < 0 there is a surplus of giving. If m ≥ 0, every agent who wants to give will select
his peak, and every agent who wants to take is either at his peak or cannot reach his
peak and so takes m . Let D(m ) be the sum of all agents’ choices given the permissible
set [−1, m ]. The function D is continuous, D(0)≤ 0, strictly increasing for any m smaller
than max{p e a k i } and is constant with value
∑
i p e a k
i > 0 for any larger m . Thus, there
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is a unique m ∗ ≥ 0 for which D(m ∗) = 0. The configuration of the set [−1, m ∗] and the
agents’ optimal choices is a convex para-equilibrium. It is a convex equilibrium since
for any larger para-equilibrium, its permissible set must be of the form [−1, m ] where
m >m ∗. However, for any such m , D(m )> 0.
In order to demonstrate the uniqueness of the convex equilibrium, it suffices to show
that any convex para-equilibrium permissible set [x , y ] is included in [−1, m ∗]. In order
for the social fund to be balanced, it must be that x ≤ 0≤ y . In equilibrium, agents who
wish to give will do so at either their peak or at x if p e a k i < x . Therefore, the total giving
in [x , y ] is not more than that in [−1, m ∗]. Since the social fund is balanced, the total
taking in [x , y ] is also less than or equal to that in [−1, m ∗], and therefore y ≤m ∗. Thus,
[x , y ]⊆ [−1, m ∗].
In the convex equilibrium outcome (y i ) every agent is at or to the left of his peak.
Thus, if (z i ) Pareto-dominates (y i ), then y i ≤ z i for all i with strict inequality for at least
one agent, violating the feasibility constraint. Therefore (y i ) is Pareto-efficient. 
Figure 3: Convex preferences for which
there is a Pareto-inefficient equilibrium
(Example D).
Comment: If we do not require the per-
missible set to be convex, then Pareto-
efficiency does not necessarily result. Con-
sider the two-agent give-and-take econ-
omy with preferences represented by the
utilities depicted in Figure 3. The set [−1,0]
is the unique convex equilibrium permissi-
ble set. However, the economy has an equi-
librium that is inefficient: Y = {−1,1} and
y 1 = −1, y 2 = 1. (Suppose that ‹Z , (z i )› is
a para-equilibrium with Z ) Y . Feasibility
requires that z 1 = −z 2. Agent 2 prefers 1 to
0, so |z 1| = |z 2| 6= 0. Since Z contains another alternative and agent 1 bottom-ranks 1
and −1, it is the case that |z 1| 6= 1. It is impossible that 0 < |z 1|< 1, because both agents
prefer |z 1| to −|z 1|.)
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Discussion: The give-and-take economy is an economic situation, in which standard
market forces do not play a role. An agent can just give or take and there is no room
for trade. Claim D demonstrates the effectiveness of norms as a non-market tool for
achieving harmony in the absence of markets.
A process which echoes the excess-demand adjustment process for achieving Wal-
rasian equilibrium can be adapted to the give-and-take economy. Given a convex per-
missible set, if there is too much taking then the lower bound on giving is relaxed and if
this is not possible, then the upper bound on taking is tightened and vice versa for too
much giving. Together with continuous adjustment of the agents’ choices, this dynamic
process ends in the convex equilibrium from any initial permissible set.
Example E: The keeping close economy
Consider a society in which each member chooses a position (whether a political stance
or a geographical location) and the survival of the group relies on the members "keep-
ing close" to one another. An extreme case is where all agents need to choose the same
location. The problem for society is that its members may have diverse ideal locations
which may not fulfill the closeness requirement. In a centralized society, the authorities
will force agents’ locations. We cannot imagine how a market can resolve this problem.
On the other hand, norms could evolve that determine the borders of the permissible lo-
cations, striking a balance between societal harmony and individual liberty. Each agent
chooses his most desirable location within the borders and the outcome is that they
live close enough. If the borders are enlarged in any way, then the resulting individual
choices would not be "close enough".
Formally, a keeping close economy is an Euclidean economy in which X is a closed
convex set of locations and F is the set of profiles for which the distance between each
pair of choices is at most d ∗. The set F satisfies the imitation condition defined in Propo-
sition 2. The consensus economy is the keeping close economy with d ∗ = 0.
Note that this economy has envy-free Pareto-efficient profiles. The following pro-
cess, in which each agent sequentially chooses a position not too far from his predeces-
sors’, leads to such a profile: agent 1 selects his ideal point x 1 = p e a k 1 in X 1 = X ; each
subsequent agent i selects his most preferred point x i in X i = {x : d (x ,x j )≤ 1,∀j < i }.
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In this economy, any Pareto-efficient profile is an outcome of some convex equilib-
rium but efficiency is not guaranteed. (In contrast, Proposition 2 implies that without
the convexity requirement every equilibrium outcome is Pareto-efficient.) Nevertheless,
for the one-dimensional case, all convex equilibria outcomes are Pareto-efficient.
Claim E For a keeping close economy:
(i) Any Pareto-efficient allocation is a convex equilibrium outcome.
(ii) A convex equilibrium may be Pareto-inefficient.
(iii) If X ⊆ R, then a profile is a convex equilibrium outcome if and only if it is Pareto-
efficient.




i y i , y j )≤max
i
d (y i , y j ), any move by an agent to another location in Y preserves
feasibility. Thus, by the Pareto efficiency of (y i ), each y i is%i -maximal in Y . Therefore,
‹Y , (y i )› is a convex para-equilibrium and by Proposition 5, (y i ) is also a convex equilib-
rium outcome.
(ii) Consider the two-agent consensus economy
with X = R2 and agents’ preferences represented
by U 1(x1,x2) = 2x2 − (x2 − x1)2 and U 2(x1,x2) =
2x2− (x2+ x1)2 (see Figure 4). Let Y = {(x1,x2) :
x2 ≤ 0}. From Y , both agents most prefer y 1 =
y 2 = (0,0) and thus the pair ‹Y , (y i )› is a convex
para-equilibrium. If there were a larger convex
para-equilibrium set Z , it would have to be of
the form {(x1,x2) : x2 ≤ z } with z > 0. However,
from Z , agent 1 prefers (z , z ) and agent 2 prefers
(−z , z ), and this profile is not in F . The
Figure 4: Multidimensional Con-
sensus Economy: Pareto-inefficient
convex equilibrium
equilibrium outcome is Pareto-inefficient since both agents prefer (0, 1) to (0, 0). This
example can be easily modified for any d ∗ > 0 by setting Y = {(x1,x2) : x2 ≤ d ∗/2}, y 1 =
(d ∗/2, d ∗/2) and y 2 = (−d ∗/2, d ∗/2).
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(iii) Let l denote the minimum of the agents’ peaks and r the maximum. For a profile
y = (y i ), define y =mini y i and y =maxi y i .
One direction follows from (i) and therefore we need to show that if ‹Y , (y i )› is a con-
vex equilibrium then (y i ) is Pareto-efficient.
If l − r ≤ d ∗, then the only convex equilibrium is where the permissible set is X and
every agent chooses his peak, obviously a Pareto-efficient outcome.
If l −r > d ∗, then it must be that for each i , y i is%i -maximal in [y , y ] and y −y = d ∗,
because otherwise the set Y could be enlarged. It must be that y ≤ r , since otherwise
‹{x : x ≥ r }, (y i = r )› is a larger convex equilibrium. Therefore, y ≤ r . Similarly y , y ≥ l .
Thus, all choices are between l and r . The outcome is Pareto-efficient. To see why note
that every agent is either at his peak, at y if his peak is to the left of y , or at y if his peak is
to the right of y . Therefore, only agents who choose y or y can improve their locations,
but every improvement for an agent with a peak on one side must be at the expense of
an agent whose peak is on the other side. 
Comment: Some natural forces might push to equilibrium. Consider the consensus
economy on a one-dimensional space. One force narrows the permissible set when
there is disagreement thus pushing towards consensus. If a consensus is achieved out-
side the interval [l , r ], then the other force extends the permissible set, pushing the con-
sensus towards efficiency.
7. The Grand Project
This paper is a part of our grand vision to explore the logic of "price-like" institutions
that can bring order to economic environments.
In Richter and Rubinstein (2015), we investigated one such institution. The model
there consists of an economy and a set of "primitive" orderings on the set X . The set
of primitive orderings is thought to be the basic language used in both the agents’ for-
mation of preferences and the equilibrium structure. Specifically, agents’ preferences
are required to be convex given the geometry generated by those primitive orderings.
The solution concept, primitive equilibrium, is a "public ordering" (on X ), interpreted
as a prestige ranking of the alternatives, and a profile of individual choices. An essen-
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tial requirement is that the public ordering is a primitive ordering. The profile is feasible
and each agent’s choice is personally optimal from among the set of alternatives that are
weakly less prestigious than the one assigned to the agent. Thus, in equilibrium agents
make choices from different individual choice sets. This is fundamentally different from
the current paper in which all agents choose from a common permissible set.
It is tempting to think about our current equilibrium concept as a degenerate case
of primitive equilibrium by defining a public ordering such that all admissible alterna-
tives are equally bottom-ranked, all forbidden alternatives are ranked above them and
all agents are assigned bottom-ranked alternatives only. However, viewing our equi-
librium in the primitive equilibrium framework is more misleading than useful, due to
essential differences between the concepts:
(i) The constraint that the set of forbidden alternatives be minimal is not present in
the primitive equilibrium notion. Thus, at most it captures the para-equilibrium notion.
(ii) The implied degenerate ordering is always not a primitive ordering.
(iii) In a primitive equilibrium, the "forbidden" set is convex whereas here it is
required that the permissible set is convex.
A more recent paper in the grand project is Rubinstein and Wolinsky (2018). While
here the invisible hand restricts the permissible set, in that paper the invisible hand sys-
tematically biases the preference relations (essentially multiplying the relevant rates of
substitution by some factor). In equilibrium, the biases are such that the profile of opti-
mal choices by the biased individuals from the entire set X is feasible. The equilibrium
notion reflects pressures on the individuals’ preferences to adjust to the feasibility con-
straint.
To sum up, as economists we are used to thinking about prices as the central mech-
anism for balancing between conflicting desires in the economy. In the absence of ex-
ternalities we are amazed by the "positive features" of the price mechanism. Our grand
vision is to divert attention to other social institutions which can (and do) bring har-
mony into a society.
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